Legal Pornography: a conclusion to chapter 2 in the works

The evidence is overwhelming: depending on the sex that actually occurs in the facts of these federal sexual harassment cases, the language in the cases–from which precedent is built, lawyers take heed, and students learn–shifts dramatically. This shift is in the same mode as pornography: Women are objectified, body parts are center stage, and lascivious, prurient detail is the norm when the sex is heterosexual. When the sex is threatening to heterosexual masculinity, heterosexual masculinity is carefully shored up with the omission of "undignified"” details, and sometimes dwelling on homophobic violence. When two women are involved the When courts are talking about sexually harassed women or girls, legally irrelevant sexual details are announced to the world. When the wronged party is a gay man, the details are somewhat similarly prurient; when it is a heterosexual man wronged by "“gay"” sexual activity, the sex is weirdly depersonalized and unmentionable.

This is the conclusion so far for my strange and beautifully horrible dissertation's chapter two. I've finally realized that the data (every circuit and Supreme court case involving sexual harassment since 1994) can't tell me what everyone really wants to know: exactly why this should be so. My hunch tells me that the answer to that question lies in a massive interviewing project, interviewing the judges themselves about each of the cases they've worked on. Speculation is the best I can do on this issue. Here are some thoughts:

Titillation: You can't read some of these cases and think that some of the judges aren't titillated.
Shame: Using sexual shame, some judges are trying to educate the public: "No woman should be subjected to this kind of behavior–do something about it!". No woman should be subjected to sexual harassment, it goes without saying. But this logic bleeds into something insidious: the idea that women should be protected from sex.

Next time I will discuss the possible ramifications of this phenomenon, that the cases read like porn.

Hateful chapters

So right now I'm working on chapter 2. It's incredible, actually: I have a really profound finding to share with the world. That finding is:

Depending on what the "sex" is that happened in a case, judges on federal sexual harassment cases write the cases differently.

That's not a clear statement; if I weren't drunk on margaritas I'd be able to say it better. But this is the first time I've been able to say it in one sentence...I think.

At any rate, let me elaborate:

I've read every federal circuit sexual harassment case since 1994, and every sexual harassment case of the US Supreme Court. And I can tell you that the cases vary in a predictable way: if the case is about a woman being harassed by a man, sexually, the cases read one way; if it's about a man being harassed by a man, it's another; if it's about a woman being harassed by a woman, it's another; and so on.

This difference is clear, strong, and salient. I think it reflects nothing less than differing standards of dignity for men and women and heterosexual and not heterosexual.

I'll elaborate when I'm less hammered.

Mark

Hanzie made me do it

So, it's true. I haven't been able to work on my blogs, much less my dissertation, in ages; I'm juggling a new full-time job, a teaching gig monday, wednesday, and friday nights, to say nothing of a relationship, an active social life, two lovely cats, and so on.

Perhaps blogging is the answer?

At the very least I can think about what it is I want to say in text form, and then perhaps that will get me in the habit of writing regularly.

I do believe it will take off the pressure of writing something super-fabulously-intelligent and get down to just writing, which I can then after the sucky first draft make super-fabulously-intelligent.